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Abstract
This Article discusses the regulation of competition in maritime transport by the European
Community. Part I examines the history of the relationship between transport and competition
policy under the “Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community.” Part II discusses
competition in maritime transport and, in particular, the new competition regulation in this area.
Part III analyzes the application of the Community’s maritime competition regulation in relation
to non-Community countries. The Article concludes that the Community must protect its interests
in the shipping industry without impeding international shipping or imposing barriers on free,
worldwide trade.
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INTRODUCTION
Success in trading depends on efficient and competitive
transport systems. At a time when markets mean more than
just territory and almost every market is an international mar-
ket, competition worldwide will be getting tougher all the
time-either in the important west-east trades along the Pa-
cific, North Atlantic, and Europe/Far East routes, or in the
north-south trades to and from Africa and Latin America. It is
therefore essential that both industrialized and developing
countries adjust to trade liberalization and international com-
petition. This means the need to incorporate substantial ele-
ments of competition policy in trade and transport policies and
to improve international cooperation on competition policy is-
sues.
The European Community (the "EC" or the "Commu-
nity") has an important role to play in this respect. In 1993, it
is expected to become a single market with a population larger
than that of the United States. This internal market will be
characterized by the free movement of goods, persons, serv-
ices, and capital. It is evident that this market will require the
supply of efficient and cheap, and thus competitive, transport
services for its success.
Transport and competition are essential parts of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the
"Treaty" or the "EEC Treaty").' Article 3(e) and (f) of the
* Deputy Head of the Administrative Unit for Transport and Tourism, Director-
ate-General for Competition, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.
The views expressed herein are personal and not necessarily the views of the Com-
mission. The author wishes to express his thanks to John Temple Lang for helpful
discussions on various issues addressed by this Article.
1. Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
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Treaty state that
[f]or the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the
Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in
accordance with the timetable set out therein:
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of
transport; [and]
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition
in the common market is not distorted.2
These provisions have quasi-constitutional status as binding
principles guiding the Community's policies in transport and
competition matters.
Both transport and competition policy also are the subject
of specific rules under the Treaty. For example, the Treaty ad-
dresses transport in Part Two, Title IV (Articles 74 through
84) and competition in Part Three, Title I (Articles 85 through
94), which includes provisions on state aids.3 The basic sub-
stantive competition rules are found in Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty. Article 87 of the Treaty obliges the Council of the
European Communities (the "Council") to adopt appropriate
regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out
in Articles 85 and 86.4
In December 1986, the Council adopted a package of leg-
islative measures toward a common maritime transport policy
including a competition regulation. 5 The most important mea-
sure, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/86 of 22 December
1986 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Application of Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Maritime Transport ("Council
2. Id. art. 3, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15-16.
3. Id. arts. 74-84, 85-94, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 29-31, 32-36, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 44-47, 47-52.
4. Id. arts. 85-86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-33, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-49.
5. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 Laying
Down Detailed Rules for the Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Mari-
time Transport, O.J. L 378/4 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821-22 [herein-
after Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport]; see also Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No. 4055/86 of 22 December 1986 Applying the Principle of Freedom
to Provide Services to Maritime Transport Between Member States and Between
Member States and Third Countries, O.J. L 378/1 (1986); Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 4057/86 of 22 December 1986 on Unfair Pricing Practices in Maritime Trans-
port, O.J. L 378/14 (1986); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4058/86 of 22 December
1986 Concerning Coordinated Action to Safeguard Free Access to Cargoes in Ocean
Trades, OJ. L 378/21 (1986).
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Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport"),6 entered
into force on July 1, 1987. 7
This Article will discuss the regulation of competition in
maritime transport by the European Community. Part I exam-
ines the history of the relationship between transport and com-
petition policy under the Treaty. Part II discusses competition
in maritime transport and, in particular, the new competition
regulation in this area. Part III will analyze the application of
the Community's maritime competition regulation in relation
to non-Community countries. This Article concludes that the
Community must protect its interests in the shipping industry
without impeding international shipping or imposing barriers
on free, worldwide trade.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RELA TIONSHIP BETWEEN
TRANSPORT AND COMPETITION POLICY UNDER
THE TREATY
It seems worthwhile to look back for a moment to the his-
tory of the relationship between transport and competition
policy under the EEC Treaty. The Community's competition
policy entered its active policy phase more than twenty-five
years ago when the question first arose whether shipping (and
air transport) were subject to the competition rules of the
Treaty like other industries.
From the outset, competition policy was seen as an inte-
gral part of the Community's basic aims and essential to the
achievement of these aims. Moreover, competition policy has
been a vital part of the creation of the common market. Over
the years, the Commission has devised a policy to support
these basic aims with a view toward ensuring that competition
is effective and undistorted. At the same time, the Commission
of the European Communities (the "Commission") has always
sought to encourage innovation and cooperation between
businesses, particularly those businesses of a cross-border na-
ture, including joint ventures, as long as these businesses are
not unduly restrictive of competition. Because competition
and transport policy were basic foundation stones of the
Treaty, however, the question must be asked: Why has it taken
6. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5.
7. Id. art. 27, OJ. L 378/4, at 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2822C, at 2070.
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twenty-five years for competition rules to be effectively applied
and enforced in the maritime sector? Several reasons exist for
slow development in this area of competition policy.
First, it must be remembered that, until 1973 upon the ac-
cession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, the
Community of six Member States was a continental block of
countries with about ninety percent of transports carried by
road, railway, or inland waterways. After 1973, however,
nearly ninety percent of export/import between the old and
the new Member States, including Greece, became seaborne
trade with almost no competitive alternative by land transport
services. Thus, for intra-Community trade, shipping became
considerably more important than it was before 1973.
Second, the controversy that arose when the Council
adopted the basic Competition Regulation (17/62) ("Regula-
tion No. 17")8 and, at the same time, decided to except from
the scope of Regulation No. 17 the areas of air and sea trans-
port further hindered the development of competition policy
in maritime transport.9 In 1968, the controversy continued
when the Council adopted Regulation (EEC) No. 1017/68 of
the Council of 19 July 1968 Applying the Rules of Competition
to Transport by Rail, Road and Inland Waterway ("Regulation
No. 1017/68 on Inland Transport").' The Council stated in
the fifth recital of Regulation No. 1017/68 on Inland Trans-
port that "since the rules of competition for transport dero-
gate from the general rules of competition, it must be made
possible for undertakings to ascertain what rules apply in any
particular case.""
The initial uncertainty on the direct applicability of the
competition rules to transport, however, has been removed by
rulings of the European Court of Justice (the "Court" or the
"Court of Justice"). In 1974, the Court held that air and sea
transport were to be treated on the same basis as other modes
8. Council Regulation No. 17, 5J.O. 204/62, Oj. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401 [hereinafter Regulation No. 17].
9. Council Regulation No. 141 of the Council Exempting Transport from the
Application of Council Regulation No. 17, 5J.O. 2751/62, Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 291, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1945.01.
10. Oj. L 175/1 (1968), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2815 [hereinafter Regula-
tion No. 1017/68 on Inland Transport].
11. Id. at 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2815, at 2031.
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of transport by means such as road, rail, inland waterway and,
thus, were subject to the general rules of the Treaty.' 2 The
Court confirmed in 1978 and 1986 that these general rules in-
cluded, in particular, the competition rules." Despite these
judgments of the Court of Justice, which confirmed the view
that the competition rules were fully applicable to air and sea
transport, the Council did not finally agree to adopt the neces-
sary regulations pursuant to Article 87 of the Treaty until 1986
for sea transport 14 and until 1987 for air transport.' 5
The new Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime
Transport has confirmed the principle of the universal applica-
tion of Articles 85 and 86 by stating in its first recital that
the rules on competition form part of the Treaty's general
provisions which also apply to maritime transport ... [and
the] detailed rules for applying those provisions are set out
in the Chapter of the Treaty dealing with the rules on com-
petition or are to be determined by the procedures laid
down therein.' 6
Therefore, the Council, through this regulation, clearly ex-
12. Commission v. French Republic, Case 167/73, 1974 E.C.R. 359, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8270.
13. Minist~re Public v. Asjes, Joined Cases 209-13/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1425, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,793; Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium,
Case 156/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1881, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8513.
14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for the regulations applying to sea
transport.
15. On December 14, 1987, the Council adopted a package of legislative meas-
ures toward a common air transport policy. These measures included the following
two competition regulations: Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87 of 14 Decem-
ber 1987 Laying Down the Procedure for the Application of the Rules on Competi-
tion to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector, O.J. L 374/1 (1987), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2831 [hereinafter Council Regulation No. 3975/87 on Air Transport],
and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the Application
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted
Practices in the Air Transport Sector, OJ. L 374/9 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2755. The other measures included the Council Directive of 14 December
1987 on Fares for Scheduled Air Services Between Member States, O.J. L 374/12
(1987), and the Council Decision of 14 December 1987 on the Sharing of Passenger
Capacity Between Air Carriers on Scheduled Air Services Between Member States
and on Access for Air Carriers to Scheduled Air-Service Routes Between Member
States, O.J. L 374/19 (1987).
16. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, O.J.
L 378/4, at 4, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821, at 2055. The new Council Regula-
tion No. 3975/87 on 'Air Transport, supra note 15, contains a first recital with the
same wording.
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pressed the view that maritime transport should be subject to
the competition rules of the Treaty.
Finally, the fact that international shipping has specific
features distinguishes it from other sectors of economic activ-
ity. These features not only arise from its tradition as a symbol
of national pride and worldwide trade, and as a means for serv-
ing political and defense requirements, but also from the fact
that the application of competition rules may have an impact
on the Community's and, in particular, the Member States' re-
lations with third countries. This is an important issue that has
been dealt with in Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Mari-
time Transport under various provisions, such as the provi-
sions regarding the United Nations Convention on a Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences (the "UN Liner Code" or the
"Code"), 7 the provisions regarding the monitoring of ex-
empted agreements, and the provisions regarding conflicts of
international law. 18
II. COUNCIL REGULATION NO. 4056/86 ON MARITIME
TRANSPORT
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport
contains both procedural and substantive provisions. Proce-
durally, the regulation provides the Commission with more ef-
fective powers to enforce the competition rules. For example,
the Commission now may require the supply of information by
governments and businesses and may conduct on-the-spot in-
vestigations.10 The Commission also may impose sanctions for
infringements of competition rules. 20 The procedural rules
and investigative powers under Council Regulation No. 4056/
86 on Maritime Transport are almost identical with the powers
provided to the Commission under Council Regulation No. 17,
Regulation No. 10 17/68 on Inland Transport, and Council
17. Apr. 6, 1974, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/I 1/Rev.1 (1974), Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 45
(Cmd. 213) (1987) [hereinafter UN Liner Code].
18. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, OJ.
L 378/4, at 4-9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821, at 2055. See infra notes 64-105
and accompanying text for a discussion of these issues.
19. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, arts.
16-18, O.J. L 378/4, at 10-11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821T-V, at 2066-67.
20. Id. arts. 19-20, at 11-12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821W-X, at 2067-
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Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 Laying
Down the Procedure for the Application of the Rules on Com-
petition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector."'
Substantively, Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Mari-
time Transport includes a block exemption for liner confer-
ences and for their agreements with transport users. 22 The ex-
emption is not limited in time. In addition, the regulation does
not obligate parties to notify the Commission of agreements,
but companies may do so when they believe their agreements
may violate the prohibition against cartels laid down by Article
85(1) of the Treaty. An "opposition procedure" has been in-
troduced for granting individual exemptions under Article
85(3), which simplifies and accelerates the process of granting
exemptions where appropriate.2 3 The Commission has re-
ceived applications for individual exemptions pursuant to arti-
cles 11(4) and 12 of the regulation in the cases of Eurocorde,
the 1237 Agreement, 24 and the Gulfway Agreement. The
Commission has also received applications for individual ex-
emptions concerning cross-channel ferry services pursuant to
article 12 of the regulation.25
21. OJ. L 374/1 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2831 [hereinafter Council
Regulation No. 3975 on Air Transport]. Compare Council Regulation No. 4056/86
on Maritime Transport, supra note 5 with Council Regulation No. 3975/87 on Air
Transport, supra and Regulation No. 1017/68 on Inland Transport, supra note 10 and
Regulation No. 17, supra note 8. For a general discussion of procedures in competi-
tion proceedings, see Kreis, Commission Procedures in Competition Proceedings-Recent Re-
forms in Practice and Law, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 145 (B. Hawk ed. 1984).
For a discussion of investigative. powers, see H. Kreis, EEC Commission Investigation
Procedures in Competition Cases, 17 INr'L LAw. 19 (1983).
22. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, arts.
3, 6, OJ. L 378/4, at 6, 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821D, 2821G, at 2059,
2061.
23. Id. art. 12, at 9-10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821P, at 2064.
24. See Notice Pursuant to Article 12(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/
86 and Article 12(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 10 17/68 Concerning Case No.
IV/33.168 Agreement 1237, O.J. C 59/2 (1990). The applications to the Commis-
sion with respect to Eurocorde and the Gulfway Agreement will be published in fu-
ture issues of the Official Journal of the European Communities.
25. See Notice Pursuant to Article 12(2) of Council Regulation No. 4056/86
Concerning Case No. IV/32.385 Sealink-SNCF, Oj. C 17/8 (1989); Notice Pursu-
ant to Article 12(2) of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 Concerning Case No. IV/
32.383 Sealink-SMZ, OJ. C 17/12 (1989).
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A. The Importance of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on
Maritime Transport
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport
is important because it provides for a fairly liberal regime, in-
creases legal security, and clarifies the relationship between
liner conferences and transport users.
1. A Liberal Regime
The UN Liner Code and Council Regulation (EEC) No.
954/79 of 15 May 1979 Concerning the Ratification by Mem-
ber States of, or Their Accession to, the United Nations Con-
vention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (the
"Brussels Package") 26 provide for a self-regulatory system of
the so-called closed conferences. The Community has ac-
cepted this self-regulatory system through the adoption of
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport.
The new regulation grants for an unlimited time period a
far-reaching block exemption for conferences and for their
agreements with users." Such unlimited block exemptions do
not exist for any other industry, not even civil aviation. In ac-
cordance with this block exemption, participants in the mari-
time transport industry must insure that their agreements con-
form to the competition rules because notification of these
agreements to the Commission has not been made compul-
sory.
If undertakings, however, seek individual exemptions
there is a simplified objections procedure available. In addi-
tion, because Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime
Transport does not require filing of tariffs or other agree-
ments, the regulation provides for a minimum of bureaucratic
and state intervention.
2. Legal Security
The new competition regulation also has increased legal
security by clarifying the fact that Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty directly apply to shipping and, therefore, has put to rest
26. O.J. L 121/1 (1979) [hereinafter Brussels Package].
27. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, arts.
3-6, O.J. L 378/4, at 6-7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821D-G, at 2059-61.
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the discussion on the applicability of Article 84(2).28 The un-
certainty over nullity of agreements by way of decisions pursu-
ant to Articles 88 and 89(2) also no longer exists.
Under the regulation, the formal right to complain no
longer applies only for governments (as was the case under Ar-,
ticle 89 of the Treaty), but now also applies for natural or legal
persons who claim to have a legitimate interest.29 The proce-
dural rules apply to all participants in maritime transport and
include clearly defined rights and obligations, hearings and
due process, protection of business secrets, and unlimited ju-
risdiction of the European Court of Justice to review decisions
of the Commission imposing sanctions.3 0
Furthermore, the Commission now has the sole power to
monitor exempted agreements pursuant to article 7 and to
grant exemptions under Article 85(3) of the Treaty pursuant to
article 14 of the regulation. 3 ' This makes it possible to prevent
the problem of uncoordinated national policies by way of vary-
ing decisions and rulings of Member States under Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty. Finally, all procedures provided for in
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport will
be carried out in close and constant liaison with the competent
authorities of the Member States and in consultation with an
advisory committee composed of national officials competent
in the sphere of maritime transport and competition matters.3 2
3. Transport Users
The new regulation is designed to support the competitive
participation of Community merchant fleets in international
shipping. The important trading interests of the Community's
exporting and importing industries using shipping services,
however, have to be considered equally so that a fair balance of
28. See id. art. 1, at 5-6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 282 1B, at 2058.
29. Id. art. 10, at 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 282 1M, at 2063. Article 10 of
the regulation states, in part, that "[clomplaints may be submitted by ... Member
States [or] .. .natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest." Id.
30. See id. arts. 10-27, at 9-13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821M-2822D, at
2063-70.
31. Id. arts. 7, 14, at 7-8, 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821H, 2821R, at
2061-62, 2065.
32. Id. art. 15, at 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821S, at 2065-66.
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interests is maintained between liner conferences and trans-
port users.
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport
clarifies the position of transport users. Their interests are in-
volved directly and indirectly. As such, conditions and obliga-
tions attach to the conference block exemption to prohibit dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality 33 and to foster consulta-
tions on general issues of principle and on forms and terms of
loyalty arrangements between transport users and confer-
ences.
34
Agreements between transport users and conferences and
certain agreements among transport users are block ex-
empted. 5 The regulation also provides the formal right for
natural and legal persons claiming a legitimate interest to sub-
mit complaints pursuant to article 10 in cases of breached obli-
gations incurred upon the granting of a conference block ex-
emption or in other cases of alleged infringements of the com-
petition rules.3 6
B. Specific Issues in Applying Competition Rules to Shipping
The Commission will have to consider a number of spe-
cific problems in applying competition rules to shipping. In
this context, the issue of non-conference competition in liner
trades will be of paramount importance. This issue is particu-
larly relevant for the monitoring of exempted agreements pur-
suant to article 7 of the regulation, of abuses of a dominant
position under article 8, and of agreements or concerted prac-
tices between conferences and outsiders on price or capacity.
The Commission is also faced with the need to solve the
problems of consortia and multimodal price fixing arrange-
ments and with the need to deal with mergers.
33. Id. art. 4, at 6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821E, at 2059.
34. Id. art. 5(2), 6, at 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821F, 2821G, at 2059-
60, 2061 (permitting loyalty arrangements between conference lines and transport
users). The loyalty arrangements permitted under article 5 of the regulation provide
safeguards making explicit the rights of transport users and conference members and
are based on the contract system or any other lawful system. Loyalty arrangements
must comply with certain conditions as set out in article 5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b).
35. Id. art. 6, at 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821G, at 2061.
36. Id. art. 10, at 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821M, at 2063.
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1. The Role of Non-Conference Competition
The presence of effective competition is an indispensable
requirement for granting exemptions from the prohibition of
cartels laid down in Article 85(1) of the Treaty. This effective
competition is of particular importance with respect to agree-
ments on price, which constitute the main element of confer-
ence agreements.
The Commission has always taken the view that an exemp-
tion from the prohibition of cartels can only be justified if
there remains effective competition or, in the language of the
Court of Justice, workable competition for the goods or serv-
ices concerned. The Court confirmed this principle in its judg-
ment in Metro v. Commission,3 7 where it stated:
The requirement contained in Articles 3 and 85 of the EEC
Treaty that competition shall not be distorted implies the
existence on the market of workable competition ... neces-
sary to ensure the observance of the basic requirements and
the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, in particular
the creation of a single market achieving conditions similar
to those of a domestic market.38
The court went on to say in the course of the same judgment
that "price competition is so important that it can never be
eliminated. ' ' 39 This corresponds to what the Court had al-
ready stated in Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commis-
sion:40
But if Article 3(f) provides for the institution of a system
ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not dis-
torted, then it requires afortiori that competition must not
be eliminated. This requirement is so essential that without
it numerous provisions of the Treaty would be pointless.
Moreover, it corresponds to the precept of Article 2 of the
Treaty according to which one of the tasks of the Commu-
nity is to "promote throughout the Community a harmoni-
ous development of economic activities". Thus the re-
straints on competition which the Treaty allows under cer-
tain conditions because of the need to harmonize the
various objectives of the Treaty, are limited by the require-
37. Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435.
38. Id. at 1904, 20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7850.
39. Id. at 1905, 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7850.
40. Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171.
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ments of Articles 2 and 3. Going beyond this limit involves
the risk that the weakening of competition would conflict
with the aims of the Common Market.4 '
This does not exclude the possibility of exempting agreements
between conferences and outsiders by individual decision if
they meet the requirements of Article 85(3) of the Treaty. In
fact, article 11 (4) of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Mari-
time Transport already provides for this potential exemp-
tion.4 2
In this context, the Eurocorde agreements are of particu-
lar importance. The history of these agreements may be
briefly described as follows. In July 1987, the same month in
which the new competition regulation entered into force, the
Commission received formal complaints from two shippers' as-
sociations involving the North Europe-U.S. Atlantic Confer-
ence (the "NEAC") and the U.S. Atlantic-North Europe Con-
ference (the "ANEC").4 3 These two shippers' associations
complained about so-called tolerated outsider agreements
("TOA") between the conferences serving the North Atlantic
trades between Europe and the United States and their major
competitors, which included Evergreen Marine Corporation
and Polish Ocean Lines.
These agreements became known collectively under the
name of Eurocorde and attracted some public attention. 44 Af-
ter the Commission started formal proceedings under the new
regulation for infringement of the competition rules, the par-
ties to Eurocorde made a formal application for individual ex-
emptions even though they had taken the legal position that
their agreements were already covered by the conference block
exemption pursuant to article 3 of Council Regulation No.
4056/86 on Maritime Transport. The Eurocorde parties' ap-
plications for individual exemptions, however, may enable the
Commission to proceed by way of a decision under Article
41. Id. at 244, 24, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, at 8299-8300.
42. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, art.
11(4), O.J. L 378/4, at 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821N, at 2063.
43. See Comm'n, Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy 47 (1987).
44. See Vail, Eurocorde Becomes More Cordial, AMERICAN SHIPPER, Oct. 1987, at 38;
EG hilt Abkommenfzir rechtswidrig, Deutsche Verkehrs-Zeitung, Jan. 21, 1988, at 1, col.
2 (Hamburg); Unsworth, EC Body Challenges Eurocorde Agreements, The Journal of Com-
merce, Jan. 20, 1988, § B, at 1, col. 4.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHIPPING
85(3) of the Treaty and, thereby, establish certain competition
policy principles concerning agreements between conferences
and non-conference lines.
Such a decision by the Commission should be considered
a constructive step. Because there might be similar agree-
ments or concerted practices on rates or capacity in other
trades in the future, it would allow the Commission to define
its enforcement policy intentions regarding so-called tolerated
outsider agreements in the context of competition and ship-
ping policy. This would be beneficial in general to both carri-
ers and transport users.
When formulating its enforcement policy regarding agree-
ments between conferences and outsiders, the Commission
may consider the following points. First, a TOA is not a con-
ference agreement and, therefore, needs an individual exemp-
tion under Article 85(3) of the Treaty to become legally valid.
A TOA also should not simply be a price-fixing arrangement, a
cargo- or market-sharing arrangement, or a capacity control
arrangement between conferences and non-conference lines.
These agreements should provide for advantages that out-
weigh the restriction of competition by such means as discus-
sion arrangements to avoid disruption of liner shipping trades
in the interests of both carriers and shippers.
Finally, a TOA might be more acceptable in U.S. trades
because, at least to some degree, the so-called open confer-
ences under the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 45are subject to in-
ternal competition through mandatory independent rate ac-
tion.46 Therefore, certain restrictions of external competition
through TOAs might be allowed. These exemptions depend
upon the expectation that independent rate action is effectively
used.
In most of these cases, however, it seems unlikely that the
Commission could give its approval unconditionally to TOAs.
One of the more important conditions or obligations attached
to an exemption might be the assurance that the parties not
discriminate between or among ports, shippers, or carriers,
whether such discrimination is the result of an agreement or
such discrimination is the result of a concerted practice. This
45. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. V 1987).
46. See id. § 1704(b)(8).
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condition follows from Article 7 of the Treaty, which says that
any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohib-
ited.47 A further condition might be that the results of discus-
sions or cooperation between the conference and independent
carriers do not bind any participants.
Therefore, following their meetings, all the participants
must retain the right to act independently without prior notice
to the other parties. There also may be a need for other condi-
tions or obligations according to the specific circumstances of
each individual case.
2. Consortia
The Council raised the issue of consortia in liner shipping
during discussions on the Commission's proposal for a compe-
tition regulation in 1984, when some Member States wanted to
except them from the prohibition of cartels. The Commission
took the view that these forms of cooperation between ship-
ping lines were agreements that might fall within the scope of
Article 85(1) of the Treaty and, if so, would need to be ex-
empted under Article 85(3) in order to become legally valid.
The question of consortia was considered so important
that, in April 1986, a hearing was held with representatives of
the Member States as well as representatives from the shipping
industry and the transport users. The result of these hearings
demonstrated that no common views existed even on the defi-
nition of what constituted a consortium except that the ship-
ping industry claimed antitrust immunity for consortia agree-
ments.
For a number of reasons, no real progress towards a solu-
tion of the problem was made before adoption of Council Reg-
ulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport. As a conse-
quence, the Council adopted this regulation without specific
provisions concerning consortia. The Council, however,
looked to the future at the time of this regulation's adoption
and invited the Commission to study the situation regarding
consortia and to consider whether it was possible and neces-
sary to provide for a block exemption. The Council inserted a
specific statement in this respect into the minutes of the meet-
47. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-
II), at 4, 298 U.N.T.S. at 17.
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ing in which it adopted Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on
Maritime Transport. This statement reads as follows:
The Council invites the Commission to study the situa-
tion regarding competition in the sectors of passenger ship-
ping, tramp shipping, joint ventures, consortia and agree-
ments between transport users to consider whether it is nec-
essary to submit new proposals. The Council notes,
however, that where the object and effect of joint ventures
and consortia is either to achieve technical improvement or
co-operation as provided for in Article 2 of the Regulation
or where close-knit consortia only cover minor market
shares, the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the
Treaty does not apply to them.48
Thus, the Commission undertook to submit a report to the
Council on whether to provide for a block exemption for con-
sortia and to submit proposals to that effect, if necessary.
Since the entry into force on July 1, 1987, of Council Regula-
tion No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, representatives from
the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of
the European Communities (the "Directorate-General for
Competition") and the shipping industry have participated in
additional discussions.
In an interim report to the Council issued inJanuary 1988,
the Commission pointed out that it was indispensable to have a
sufficiently broad and reliable basis of factual knowledge of
consortia agreements to determine whether it was justifiable to
propose a block exemption. The Directorate-General for
Competition urged the industry to cooperate fully and, in par-
ticular, to provide a number of texts of consortia agreements.
Because the Commission does not receive notification of these
agreements, the precise character and contents of them were
unknown to the Directorate-General for Competition. After
numerous further contacts and discussions with shipowners,
the industry representatives finally cooperated constructively.
It should be noted that shippers were opposed to a block
exemption. The European Shippers' Councils held the view
that consortia should apply for individual exemptions and that
conditions and obligations, including an obligation to conduct
48. Council Doc. No. 11584/86 MAR 84, Annex III (Dec. 19, 1986).
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meaningful consultations with shippers, should be attached to
each exemption granted by the Commission.
As to the legal status of consortia under Community com-
petition law, the following points should be taken into account.
First, consortia could rarely, if ever, be regarded as mergers
between the participating shipping lines. As a rule, consortia
agreements contain provisions to terminate the agreement
with different periods of notice.
Moreover, there seems to be no case in which any of the
parties to consortia transferred all its assets or activities to the
consortium or completely and irreversibly abandoned business
in the area covered by the consortium. On the contrary, it
seems that consortia members in general remain free to act in-
dependently on other routes or to join other consortia. If con-
sortia, however, were to be considered as mergers or concen-
trations in the sense of article 3 of Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concen-
trations Between Undertakings (the "Merger Control Regula-
tion"),49 these consortia would fall outside the scope of appli-
cation of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Trans-
port pursuant to article 22(2) of Council Regulation No. 4064/
89.50 The Commission has taken the view that, in general,
consortia constitute operations or joint ventures within the
meaning of article 3(2) of the Merger Control Regulation.5 '
In most cases, consortia are not purely technical arrange-
ments because there are few, if any, agreements whose sole ob-
ject and effect are to achieve only technical, non-commercial
cooperation. Most of these agreements are not limited to tech-
nical arrangements on joint fleet and terminal operations, but
also contain commercial arrangements that restrict competi-
tion. Finally, consortia members regulate the use of their ves-
sel capacities in given trades and are actual or potential com-
petitors. For these reasons, consortia, other than perhaps in
exceptional cases, cannot be considered as falling within the
49. Merger Control Regulation, art. 3, O.J. L 395/1, at 4 (1989).
50. Id. at 11. Article 22(2) of the Merger Control Regulation provides that
"[r]egulations No. 17, (EEC) No. 1017/68, (EEC) No. 4056/86 and (EEC) No. 3975/
87 shall not apply to concentrations as defined in Article 3." Id. (citations omitted).
51. See Council Doc. No. 10958/89 RC 51, at 4 (Dec. 19, 1989) (statement for
entry into the Council minutes entitled "Commission statement re Article 3(2), first
indent" of the Merger Control Regulation).
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scope of article 2 of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Mari-
time Transport.
Consortia also are not covered by the conference block ex-
emption provided by article 3 of Council Regulation No. 4056/
86 on Maritime Transport. It seems to be the common view
that, even operating as conference members, consortia are not
conferences themselves. 'Conferences are historic arrange-
ments going back for more than a century and exist essentially
to ensure that their members charge the same rate of freight.52
Consortia also pursue different objectives and organize
differently than conferences. The fact that three to six conven-
tional ships may equal the cargo capacity of one container ship
means that, in many cases, single shipping companies no
longer are capable of providing on their own a credible service
to shippers in the new era. To be viable, a shipping service
must provide a regular service, such as weekly sailings, to its
customers. Therefore, rationalization"3 of schedules is a sine
qua non of liner shipping with each participating line being allo-
cated slots in each sailing.
If the-aim of consortia is to reduce the costs to the partici-
pants by achieving economies of scale, the consortium may be
the modus operandi for achieving rationalization and increasing
competitiveness. Therefore, the future of liner shipping may
rest with cooperation agreements like consortia more than
with conferences.
Consortia are also different from conferences in restrict-
ing competition. The effect of consortia agreements largely
eliminates competition between the parties on a given trade.
In most of the cases, the consortia agreements eliminate com-
petition in (1) the provision and use of capacity and transport
facilities; (2) the timing of sailings; (3) the marketing on a
given trade; (4) inland operations, at least in a number of
cases; and (5) price competition that is eliminated either by
conference membership or by arrangements in the consortium
agreement.5 4 Thus, many consortia agreements contain re-
52. See generally A. HERMAN, SHIPPING CONFERENCES 8 (1983) (noting coopera-
tion between competing shipowners on U.K.-Calcutta route in 1875).
53. The term "rationalization" generally refers to the allocation of the number
of sailings, the ports to be covered, and, in certain circumstances, the number of tons
a liner may carry during a specified period.
54. A number of consortium agreements contain provisions on price-fixing au-
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strictive arrangements that extend beyond the scope of article
3 of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport
and, therefore, would not be covered by the block exemption
for conferences even if they were to be considered as similar to
conference agreements.
Several arguments, however, suggest that consortia could
be granted a block exemption under Article 85(3) of the
Treaty. Commercial pressures on the liner shipping industry
have created the need for structural adjustments if wasteful use
of resources is to be avoided. The shipping industry is a capi-
tal intensive one with a high proportion of fixed to variable
costs. Ships, therefore, need to be well utilized if the capital
costs are to be covered. Individual enterprises acting alone,
without strong financial resources, are in a vulnerable position
if heavy overcapacity should show itself on a particular trade
route.
Historically, the formation of shipping conferences might
have been the most obvious use of existing shipping resources
on individual trade routes. The development of container
services, however, brought about even stronger pressures for
cooperation and rationalization on the longer deep sea trade
routes. Therefore, the necessity to maintain regular services
led shipping lines to join their fleet operations on container-
ized trade routes.
Consortia could help to provide the necessary means for
improving the productivity of liner shipping and promoting
technical and economic progress. In return, users of transport
services offered by consortia obtain several important advan-
tages. First, these users are ensured regular sailings at prices
that do not depend on which ships are used for their contain-
ers. Economies of scale in the use of ships and onshore facili-
ties are achieved. Costs are also reduced because consortia
tend to bring about higher levels of capacity utilization. Con-
sortia increase the quality of shipping services by using more
modern ships and equipment as well as port facilities. Last,
but not least, through provision of joint inland services, con-
sortia are responding to many shippers' requirements for effi-
thority or, at least, on obligations to coordinate pricing policies and to avoid or to
reduce price competition between the participants. These agreements, however, are
not to be considered as conferences by their members.
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cient door-to-door transport. For all these reasons, serious
consideration should be given to the possibility of granting a
block exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty.
Regarding the form that this block exemption should take,
it seems that it would need to be an independent self-con-
tained regulation rather than an amendment or addition to
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport for
the following two reasons. First, consortia are a specialized
and complex form ofjoint ventures covering a large variety of
different arrangements. Despite the efforts of the Directorate-
General for Competition and the interested industries, it has
proven impossible to draft a block exemption for joint ven-
tures in general. This demonstrates the need for a new, differ-
ent approach to consortia. Second, a separate, group exemp-
tion is required because some consortia deal with multimodal
transport operations, which fall partly within the scope of
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport,
partly under Regulation No. 1017/68 on Inland Transport,
and, insofar as containers are concerned, under Regulation
No. 17.
As has been discussed above, consortia deal with mul-
timodal transport and collective price fixing for land, as well as
sea transport. These consortia are not covered by the excep-
tion for technical agreements pursuant to article 2 of Council
Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport because the
achievement of technical improvement or cooperation is not
their sole objective. In addition, consortia are covered neither
by the block exemption in article 3 of Regulation No. 4056/86
on Maritime Transport because they are not liner conferences,
nor by the block exemption pursuant to article 4 of Regulation
No. 1017/68 on Inland Transport because, in general, mem-
bers of consortia are not small or medium-sized undertakings
in the field of road or inland waterway transport.
Unlike most commercial and industrial joint ventures, the
scope, parties, activities, and terms of consortia are altered fre-
quently. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult to decide
which specific clauses and arrangements of consortia agree-
ments should be permitted. In addition, it would be undesir-
able to employ a case-by-case approach rather than a block ex-
emption because, every time the terms of a consortium agree-
ment were altered, it often would make legal advice necessary,
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and, perhaps, individual exemption procedures necessary
under the maritime competition regulation. Any effort to
grant a block exemption for consortia as rationalization cartels
should concentrate on clarifying the conditions and/or obliga-
tions under which consortia may be exempted from the gen-
eral prohibition of cartels pursuant to Article 85(3) of the
Treaty.
3. Multimodal Transport
Although the evolution of containerization has affected all
modes of transport, containerization has made the greatest im-
pact on international liner shipping. In most cases, the move-
ment of cargo is no longer a matter of only blue water carriage.
Therefore, shipping lines often become multimodal transport
operators offering their customers door-to-door transport
services.55 The evolution of containerization is also important
from a competition policy point of view because muhimodal
transport services may contribute to technical and economic
progress and may improve the quality of transport services.
Moreover, the multimodal transport operations may lead to an
integration of transport markets in the interests of both carri-
ers and users.
A competition law problem, however, exists with respect
to the "through" rates, applied by liner conferences, consortia,
or other participants to similar agreements. One such prob-
lem may arise in the area of collective price fixing for mul-
timodal transport as well as inland transport and, as the case
may be, air transport services.
In the United States, through-rate price-fixing agreements
by liner conferences are exempted from the antitrust laws
under the Shipping Act of 1984.56 Under Community law, the
situation is different. The Commission has taken the view that
multimodal transport price-fixing is not permitted under ex-
isting law because the block exemption for liner conferences
pursuant to article 3 of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on
55. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON A CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT at
1-16, U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF/17 Vol. I, U.N. Sales No. E.81.1I.D.7(Vol. I) (1981).
56. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1703(a), 1704, 1706 (Supp. V 1987).
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Maritime Transport does not coyer it.57 This view has been
opposed by a number of Member States and by representatives
of the transport industry. It has been suggested that mul-
timodal transport operations and through-rate fixing are al-
ready covered by the conference block exemption. In addi-
tion, the parties suggesting this view have referred to articles 2
and 5(3) of the regulation5 and to a statement in the minutes
of the Council of Ministers on the adoption of Council Regula-
tion No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, which reads as fol-
lows:
The Commission states that multi-modal sea/land transport
operations are subject to the rules of competition adopted
for land transport and to those laid down for sea transport.
In practice, non-application of Article 85(1) will be the rule
as regards the organization and execution of successive or
supplementary multi-modal sea/land transport operations
and the fixing or application of inclusive rates for such
transport operations, since both Article 2 of this Regulation
and Article 3 of Regulation No. 1017/68 state that the pro-
hibition laid down by Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not
apply to such practices.59
According to article 1(2), the Council Regulation No. 4056/86
on Maritime Transport "shall apply only to international mari-
time transport services from or to one or more Community
ports."6 The eleventh recital of the regulation further states
that "inland transports . . . continue to be subject to Regula-
tion (EEC) No. 1017/68."'6' Because the scope of the block
exemption for conference agreements pursuant to article 3 of
Council Regulation No. 4056 on Maritime Transport cannot
be wider than the scope of the regulation itself, however, the
conference exemption does not cover multimodal price-fixing
agreements. Moreover, the arguments advanced with respect
to articles 2 and 5(3) of this regulation are not convincing.
57. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, OJ.
L 378/4, at 6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821, at 2059.
58. See Hootz, Seeschijffahrt im deutschen und im EWG-Kartellrecht, in 67 SCHRIFrEN
DES DEUTSCHEN VEREINS FOR INTERNATIONALES SEERECHT 36 (Hamburg 1988).
59. Council Doc. No. 11584/86 MAR 84, Annex III, at 5 (Dec. 19, 1986).
60. Council Regulation No, 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, art.
1(2), O.J. L 378/4, at 6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821B, at 2058 (emphasis
added).
61. Id. at 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821, at 2057.
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Price-fixing agreements for door-to-door rates are com-
mercially restrictive arrangements and do not have as their sole
object and effect the achievement of technical cooperation in
the sense of article 2(1) of the regulation. Although the provi-
sions of articles 5(3) and 5(4) admittedly are not very clear,62
these provisions only constitute obligations attached to the
conference block exemption, which, if anything, limit the ex-
emption and certainly do not extend it beyond the scope of the
regulation itself. The statement of the Commission for the
Council minutes expressly refers to the technical exceptions as
provided for under article 2 of Council Regulation No. 4056/
86 on Maritime Transport and article 3 of Regulation No.
1017/68 on Inland Transport. The statement, therefore, does
not refer to the question of the block exemption, but confirms
the applicability of both regulations in cases of multimodal
sea/land transport operations. These conclusions are sup-
ported by the fact that the European Parliament proposed an
amendment to article 3 of the draft regulation adding that
"[t]he aforesaid exemption shall also apply to 'intermodal
transport' (i.e. maritime transport including transport to and
from ports), ' 3  but this proposed amendment was not
adopted by the Council.
The Council's rejection of this amendment strongly sup-
62. Article 5(3) of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport pro-
vides as follows:
3. Serices not covered by the freight charges
Transport users shall be entitled to approach the undertakings of their
choice in respect of inland transport operations and quayside services not
covered by the freight charge or charges on which the shipping line and the
transport user have agreed.
Id art. 5(3), at 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821F, at 2060. Article 5(4) states:
4. Availability of tariffs
Tariffs, related conditions, regulations and any amendments thereto shall be
made available on request to transport users at reasonable cost, or they shall
be available for examination at offices of shipping lines and their agents.
They shall set out all the conditions concerning loading and discharge, the
exact extent of the services covered by the freight charge in proportion to
the sea transport and the land transport or by any other charge levied by the
shipping line and customary practice in such matters.
Id. art. 5(4), at 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821F, at 2060.
63. See Amendments to the Proposal for a Council Regulation Laying Down De-
tailed Rules for the Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Maritime
Transport, O.J. C 255/176, at 177 (1986).
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ports the argument that multimodal price-fixing agreements
are not covered by the block exemption under Council Regula-
tion No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport. The parties to these
arrangements, however, may be granted individual exemptions
under article 12 of the regulation. If one takes into account
the economic importance and possible benefits of multimodal
transport services, it would be desirable to find a solution for
granting a block exemption under Articles 85(3) and 87 of the
Treaty.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE REGULATION ON
MARITIME TRANSPORT TO NON-COMMUNITY
COUNTRIES
The scope of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Mari-
time Transport is defined in article 1(2), which states, "It shall
apply only to international maritime transport services from or
to one or more Community ports."'  The Community compe-
tition rules do not apply only to intra-Community traffic but
also apply to shipping trades with third countries.
A. The International Dimension
The UN Liner Code and the Brussels Package of 1979 un-
doubtedly prompted the Commission's proposal for a compe-
tition regulation. 6- Therefore, Council Regulation No. 4056/
86 on Maritime Transport clearly has an international dimen-
sion and an impact on non-Community undertakings.
What does this mean in practice? First, it means that not
only Community shipping lines, but also non-EC carriers, ben-
efit from the far-reaching block exemption for conferences and
for their agreements with transport users without being re-
quired to file all their agreements with the Commission. These
non-EC carriers also benefit from the opportunity to apply for
individual exemptions in other cases, to lodge complaints with
the Commission in cases of alleged law infringements, and to
appeal Commission decisions before the Court of Justice. If
64. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, art.
1(2), OJ. L 378/4, at 6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821B, at 2058.
65. See Proposal for a Council Regulation Laying Down Detailed Rules for the
Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Maritime Transport, OJ. C 282/4
(1981); Brussels Package, supra note 26.
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third-country companies, however, want to operate in Commu-
nity shipping trades, they must also respect certain obligations.
For instance, these third-country companies should consult
with transport users, 66 become subject to monitoring of ex-
empted agreements,6 7 should not abuse any dominant posi-
tion,68 and should cooperate with the Directorate-General for
Competition by supplying information or by submitting to in-
vestigations, if necessary.6 9
Second, although the application of EC competition law
cannot stop entirely at the edge of the Community's waters,
this law does not apply to foreign-to-foreign trades, or the car-
riage of cargo without calling at Community ports, and the
Commission does not claim extraterritorial jurisdiction over
such trades. In this respect, reference should be made to the
Court of Justice's judgment of September 27, 1988 in A. Ahl-
strrm Osakeyhti"v. Commission (the "WoodpulpJudgment"), 70 where
the Court confirmed that the key to the jurisdictional reach of
EC competition law is the territoriality principle. The Wood-
pulp Judgment involved restrictive agreements, contrary to Arti-
cle 85 of the Treaty, between a number of companies produc-
ing woodpulp, all of whom had their headquarters outside the
European Community. The Court found that these companies
either were exporting directly to Community countries or were
doing business in these countries through subsidiaries or
agents. The woodpulp-producing companies claimed that the
Commission had no jurisdiction to apply EC competition rules
to them because their headquarters were located outside the
common market's territory. The Court did not accept this ar-
gument and ruled that an infringement of Article 85 of the
Treaty
consists of conduct made up of two elements: the forma-
tion of the agreement, decision or concerted practice, and
the implementation thereof. If the applicability of prohibi-
tions laid down under competition law were made to de-
66. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Regulation, supra note 5, art.
5, 0J. L 378/4, at 6-7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821F, at 2059-61.
67. Id. art. 7, at 7-8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821H, at 2061-62.
68. Id. art. 8, at 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821J, at 2062.
69. Id. arts. 16-18, at 10-11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821T-V, at 2066-67.
70. Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 125-29/85, 1988 E.C.R. -,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,595.
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pend on the place where the agreement, decision or con-
certed practice was formed, the result would obviously be to
give undertakings an easy means of evading those prohibi-
tions. The decisive factor therefore is the place where it is
implemented.
Accordingly, the Community's jurisdiction to apply its
competition rules to such conduct is covered by the territo-
riality principle as universally recognized in public interna-
tional law. 71
The Court, however, did not utilize the "effects doctrine," but
rather the "implementation text," which is broad enough to
cover the vast majority of cases in which the Commission
would need to take action against cartels.7
The Member States and non-EC countries, however, may
face problems in trades where the UN Liner Code or other in-
ternational agreements apply. The compatibility between the
UN Liner Code, EC competition rules, and, with respect to the
African-Caribbean-Pacific ("ACP") countries, the Fourth ACP-
EEC Convention of Lom6 (the "Lome IV Convention") 73 is es-
sential. Therefore, it is useful to analyze briefly the relation-
ship between Community legislation and these agreements.
B. The UN Liner Code
After World War II, there was great pressure, most nota-
bly from developing countries, for a worldwide regime for
liner shipping. Developing countries felt that they were being
"squeezed" and wanted a larger role in the operation and the
profits of the shipping services that affected them. After long
discussions and negotiations within the developed world and
within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment ("UNCTAD"), the Convention on a Code of Conduct for
Liner Conferences emerged at Geneva in April 1974.TM
One of the best known provisions of the Code is the "40/
71. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,612.
72. See Temple Lang, Institutional Aspects of EC-EFTA Relations, in CREATING A Eu-
ROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF EC-EFTA RELATIONS 17, 32 (M. Robin-
son & J. Findlater eds. 1989) (available from the Irish Centre for European Law,
Trinity College, Dublin).
73. Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 809 (1990) [hereinafter Lom6 IV Convention].
74. See UN Liner Code, supra note 17.
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40/20" cargo sharing rule of article 2(4), which addresses par-
ticipation in trade and states:
When determining a share of trade within a pool of individ-
ual member lines and/or groups of national shipping lines
in accordance with Article 2(2), the following principles re-
garding their right of participation in the trade carried by
the conference shall be observed, unless otherwise mutually
agreed:
(a) The group of national shipping lines of each of two
countries the foreign trade between which is carried by the
conference shall have equal rights to participate in the
freight and volume of traffic generated by their mutual for-
eign trade and carried by the conference;
(b) Third-country shipping lines, if any, shall have the
right to acquire a significant part, such as 20 per cent, in the
freight and volume of traffic generated by that trade.75
The UN Liner Code attracted much support in the developing
world. The industrialized countries, however, gave it a rather
mixed reception. In the Community, several Member States
voted in favor of it, but others were opposed. This presented
the Community with the danger of a wide divergence between
national shipping practices in the Community if the Code were
to be adopted by some Member States and not by others.
The Community eventually achieved a common position
on the UN Liner Code in 1979 in the form of the Brussels
Package.76 This regulation requires Member States to adopt
the Code subject to certain modifications.77 The famous "40/
40/20" cargo sharing rule contained in article 2 of the Code
caused the greatest difficulty in compatibility with the princi-
ples of the Community and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (the "OECD"). Because it could
not be accepted within the Community, article 4(2) of the
Brussels Package stated that, if a party decided to display this
rule, article 2 of the UN Liner Code should not be applied in
conference trades between Member States and between Mem-
ber States and other OECD countries that are parties to the
75. Id. art. 2(4), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/I I/Rev.I Annex I, at 4-5, Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 45 (Cmd. 213) at 5.
76. Brussels Package, supra note 26.
77. See id. Annex I, at 4.
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Code. 8
As to the relationship between the UN Liner Code and
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, the
following points should be considered. First, the Member
States that have ratified the UN Liner Code,79 and the Commu-
nity, if it would accede as such to it, are or will be faced with an
international obligation to respect the Code. Thus, the Code
has become a political and legal fact that cannot be ignored by
Community authorities.80 The Commission has recognized
the right of the conference system to exist by granting confer-
ence agreements a block exemption.
On the other hand, the UN Liner Code is silent on the
degree of competition that should exist in the markets con-
cerned, which does not imply that the Code has no effect on
competition in the field on liner shipping services. The Brus-
sels Package, however, has added nothing to the Code on this
basic point, but states, in its last recital, that "it is nevertheless
necessary to avoid possible breaches by conferences of the
rules of competition" in order to eliminate incompatibilities
between the Code and Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.8 ' The
Brussels Package accomplished the goal of avoiding breaches
of the competition rules by eliminating the application of the
"40/40/20" cargo sharing rule to conference trades between
EC countries or, on a reciprocal basis, to other OECD coun-
tries.82 Finally, although the Code and the Brussels Package
are to be regarded as a concession to meet the aspirations of
developing countries, nothing in their provisions may be inter-
preted in such a way as to recognize the UN Liner Code as a
set of competition rules in EC liner shipping.
The application and the enforcement of Council Regula-
78. Id. art. 4(2), at 2.
79. As of 1987, the UN Liner Code had been signed or acceded to by seventy-
four countries including half of the EC Member States-Belgium, Denmark, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. UN
Liner Code, supra note 17, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 45 (Cmd. 213) at 29-30. In addition, as
of the same year, nineteen of these countries, including France and the Federal Re-
public of Germany, had ratified the Code. Id. at 29.
80. For a more thorough analysis of the UN Liner Code's importance within the
European Communities, see Vermote, The Application of the United Nations Liner Code
Within the European Communities, 23 EUR. TRANSP. L. 571 (1988).
81. Brussels Package, supra note 26, O.J. L 121/1, at 1.
82. Id. art. 4, at 2-3.
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tion No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, therefore, is not le-
gally dependent on the Code, and any review of the UN Liner
Code should not involve possible conflicts between this con-
vention and Community law. In addition, when accepting a
system of conferences that conform to the Code, the Commis-
sion should be entitled to determine the degree of competition
it considers necessary in order to meet the requirements con-
tained in Articles 3(f), 85, and 86 of the Treaty and, if a conflict
should exist, to require the operators in question to comply
with the law and/or to propose amendments to the regulation,
if appropriate.
For instance, any regulation of the participation by non-
conference lines that differs from the UN Liner Code resolu-
tion on non-conference lines would be contrary to the princi-
ple of closed conferences operating in open trades.8 3 For this
reason, this type of regulation would lead to a conflict with ar-
ticles 3 and 7 of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime
Transport, which provides for the block exemption of liner
conferences and the monitoring of exempted agreements.8 4
The UN Liner Code must not take precedence over the
Community's competition rules in trade with third countries.
Nevertheless, in applying the competition regulation, a need
exists to consider the often rather difficult relations with third
countries and the Community's concerns in the areas of com-
petition, transport, and general trade policies. Articles 7(2)
and 9 of Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Trans-
port provide the necessary instruments to consider these
problems and concerns.8 "
The signing of the Lomb IV Convention in Lome, Togo,
on December 15, 1989, has also confirmed the conclusions set
forth above.8 6 Articles 86(2), 87, and 88 of the Third ACP-
83. See UN Liner Code, supra note 17, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/I l/Rev.l Annex II,
at 1. The conference on the liner code adopted Resolution No. 2 on non-conference
lines April 6, 1974. Id. This resolution provided that non-conference lines should
not be prevented from competing with conferences as long as they adhered to the
principle of fair competition on a commercial basis. id.
84. See Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5,
arts. 3, 7, OJ. L 378/4, at 6, 7-8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821D, 2821H, at
2059, 2061-62.
85. Id. arts. 7(2), 9, at 8, 8-9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 282 1H, 282 1K, at
2061-62, 2062-63.
86. See Lom6 IV Convention, supra note 73.
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EEC Convention (the "Lom6 III Convention") 87 on transport
and, in particular, international shipping, remained unchanged
in articles 126(2), 127, and 128 of the Lome IV Convention.88
The Community and the ACP countries, however, have made
unilateral declarations on the interpretation of articles 126(2),
127, and 128 of the Lome IV Convention that are not fully
compatible with each other.8 9 In particular, this incompatibil-
ity relates to the question of unrestricted access to liner trades
and anti-competitive practices affecting liner conferences as
well as non-conference lines.
In ajoint statement for entry into the minutes, the Council
of Ministers stated:
The Council and the Commission declare that the Articles
86, 87 and 88 [now articles 126, 127, and 128 of the Lomb
IV Convention] are the basis for the maritime relations be-
tween the ACP and the EEC states, and that the phrase "re-
strictive and anti-competitive practices" is to be interpreted
as affecting companies both inside and outside liner confer-
ences and also companies or vessels involved in the bulk
87. Dec. 8, 1984, O.J. L 86/3 (1986).
88. Compare id. arts. 84-94, at 34-35 with Lom6 IV Convention, supra note 73,
arts. 123-34, 29 I.L.M at 835-36.
89. See Lom6 IV Convention, supra note 73, Annexes XVIII, XIX, reprinted in THE
ACP-EEC COURIER, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 162. The Community declaration states, in
part:
The rules of unrestricted access to the trade on a commercial basis as set out
in Articles 126(2), 127 and 128 exclude restrictive and anti-competitive
practices, affecting all shipping companies. The Community and its Mem-
ber States reaffirm that these rules are designed to increase the competitive-
ness of shipping companies and thereby benefiting exporters and importers.
The Community and its Member States further recall that competitive ac-
cess to the bulk trade shall not be impaired.
Id. Annex XIX, at 162. The ACP declaration states, in part:
Conscious of the need to ensure that ACP shipping industries are able to
participate on an equitable basis in markets which are dominated by power-
ful international shipping companies, the ACP States reaffirm their view that
the provisions of Articles 126(2), 127 and 128 of the Convention do not
imply that such international companies can operate, either in or outside
liner conferences, without constraint.
The spirit of the Convention requires that the principle of fair competition
is not interpreted solely in favour of such companies, but also takes into
account the right of ACP States to greater and fairer participation in all
freight generated by their external trade and the need to facilitate the devel-
opment of their industries.
Id. Annex XVIII, at 162.
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trade. The policies and practices of the Community and its
Member States will be based upon this interpretation.9'
Thus, the Commission and the Member States have reiterated
their intention to respect fully the principle of a system of un-
distorted competition pursuant to Article 3(f) of the Treaty in
maritime transport.
C. Open Trades
The Commission already in 1985 viewed with concern the
increasing trend to exclude non-conference competition from
trades in which so-called closed conferences, or conferences
pursuant to the rules of the UN Liner Code, operate. 9' Several
cases exist in which certain countries reserve cargo and regu-
late or control outsiders in their liner trades with the Commu-
nity and, thereby, close access of outsiders to the trade or re-
strict their freedom to operate in the trades. When these
countries preclude outsider competition, however, the liner
conferences operating in these trades become monopolies,
and Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport
requires the withdrawal of the block exemptions for them.
Since the entry into force of the new competition regula-
tion in maritime transport, a number of formal complaints
have been lodged with the Commission by shipowners and
transport users as well as by Member States. The parties
mainly direct these complaints against cargo allocation systems
and restrictions of free access to and free operation in trades
between Europe and West and Central Africa for non-confer-
ence carriers.92
In 1988, based on a Council decision pursuant to article 3
of Council Regulation No. 4058/86 of 22 December 1986
Concerning Coordinated Action to Safeguard Free Access to
Cargoes in Ocean Trades ("Council Regulation No. 4058/
86"),9s the Community took coordinated action to safeguard
free access to cargoes in ocean trade. In considering the
problems encountered in West and Central African trades in-
90. Council Doc. TFN/MISC/MIX/181 (Dec. 12, 1989) (entry for the minutes
of the Council regarding Lom6 IV Convention).
91. See Progress Towards a Common Transport Policy, BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp.
5 (1985).
92. See Comm'n, Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy 47 (1987).
93. Oj. L 378/21 (1986).
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volving countries that signed the Lom6 III Convention, the
ACP states and the Community took diplomatic initiatives pur-
suant to the framework of this convention. An expert group
from the Community and the African states took part in nego-
tiations that resulted in an agreed-upon report on general
principles (including free access to trades for non-conference
lines). This report was submitted to a meeting of the ACP-
EEC Council of Ministers in Mauritius during May 1988. The
Council noted the report and instructed the experts to pursue
their work.94
The restrictions in Community trades with the main West
and Central African states, however, still exist. Another round
of talks with the African governments during April 1989 in
Brussels did not produce any results because the African side
withdrew from the compromise arrangement of March-May
1988. In 1989, the Commission conducted investigations into
the practices of liner conferences serving West and Central Af-
rican trades for alleged infringements of Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty. As a result of these investigations, the Commission
may issue decisions pursuant to articles 7 and 8 of Council
Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport.
D. Conflicts of Law and Enforcement
Although the Commission's jurisdiction to apply its com-
petition laws is governed by the territoriality principle, differ-
ences may exist in the regulatory approach to be used and the
enforcement of these laws. In this instance, one should draw a
distinction between countries that have acceded to the UN
Liner Code and those that have not acceded to it. These dif-
ferences might be illustrated by examining the situations in the
United States and in West and Central Africa.
It should be noted that there have been no specific diffi-
culties between the Community and the United States. Both
sides support commercially-oriented merchant fleets driven
basically by market forces and, furthermore, both sides are
moving towards open trades and competitive shipping. The
Community and the United States, however, differ in their ap-
proaches to the regulatory policy that should be applied to
liner shipping. The differences mainly involve the choice be-
94. See Comm'n, Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy 32 (1988).
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tween a governmental regulatory system or a self-regulatory
system of liner conferences.
In an attempt to maintain competition, the United States
prohibits closed conferences. 9 European countries andJapan,
on the other hand, allow conferences to organize as they wish
and believe that competition will be maintained as long as ef-
fective, non-conference operators remain in the trades. In ad-
dition, the United States requires all shipping agreements to
be filed with the Federal Maritime Commission, a regulatory
authority in the United States, before receiving antitrust immu-
nity.96 Under EC competition law, however, conferences have
been granted a far-reaching block exemption, which is not lim-
ited in time and does not make individual notification to the
Commission compulsory.97
The third difference between the Community and the
United States is the extent of the jurisdiction because, at least
in part, the United States has applied its laws to activities that
the European governments consider to be outside the proper
jurisdiction or the appropriate regulatory interest of the
United States. In the Woodpulp Judgment, the Court of Justice
clarified European Community law with respect to extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. 98 In any case, the application of EC law does
not reach as far as U.S. antitrust law and does not apply to the
"foreign commerce" of the Community as such.
Because the West and Central African states may be de-
fined as "codists," or signatories to the UN Liner Code, these
countries differ in approach from the Community mainly in the
application of the Code. Major problems stem from the fact
that these countries want to have a bigger share of the traffic in
their trades and, therefore, in contrast to the Code, demand an
application of the "40/40/20" rule not only to conference
cargo but to the whole trade.
These countries want to limit the access of outsiders to
their trades and have issued cargo reservation laws and estab-
95. See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1704(b), 1709(c)(1), 1709(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
96. See id. § 1704(a).
97. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, arts.
3, 6, 0.J. L 378/4, at 6, 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821D, 2821G, at 2059,
2061.
98. See Woodpulp Judgment, Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 125-
29/85, 1988 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,595.
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lished central freight booking offices for the allocation of
cargo, which is contrary to their international obligations
under the Code, including the resolution on non-conference
shipping lines, and under the Lom6 conventions. In these
cases, the Community has responded by adopting a decision in
accordance with Council Regulation No. 4058/86,11 and by ini-
tiating investigations under the competition regulation be-
cause, in cases where a trade is closed, the conference has a
monopoly and the block exemption must be withdrawn.
Thus, there may be the potential for overlapping regula-
tory claims and, perhaps, clashes ofjurisdiction in the Commu-
nity's shipping trades with other countries. Of course, the pos-
sibility exists of an exchange of information and of views on
shipping matters within the Consultative Shipping Group and
between non-EC states and the Commission.
In specific cases of alleged infringements of the law, Coun-
cil Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport provides
for appropriate safeguards itself by virtue of articles 7 and 9.100
Thus, where actual or potential competition in a liner trade is
absent or eliminated contrary to Article 85(3) of the Treaty,
the Commission shall withdraw the benefit of the block exemp-
tion from the conference operating in that trade. If the ab-
sence or elimination of competition is the result of action by a
third country, however, the Commission may enter into con-
sultations with competent authorities of that country in accord-
ance with article 7(2) of the regulation on competition in mari-
time transport.' 0' If necessary, these consultations will be fol-
lowed by negotiations in order to remedy the situation. 0 2
In all other cases where the application of EC competition
rules may conflict with non-EC country laws to compromise
important Community trading and shipping interests, the
Commission would have to use article 9 of Council Regulation
4056/86 on Maritime Transport.10 3 Article 9 provides the nec-
essary procedure to consult and to negotiate with the other
99. See O.J. L 378/21 (1986).
100. Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport, supra note 5, arts.
7, 9, OJ. L 378/4, at 7-8, 8-9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821H, 2821K, at 2061-
62, 2062-63.
101. Id. art. 7(2), at 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2821H, at 2061-62.
102. Id.
103. Id. art. 9, at 8-9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 282 1K, at 2062-63.
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country concerned. 1°4
Such consultations and negotiations, however, must face
certain challenges. One of these challenges is to provide for
rapid procedures. Another one is to avoid the exercise of ju-
risdiction concurrently, whenever possible. Where parties are
not willing to give up the opportunity of having the last word,
they should agree to take full account of each other's interests
and to adapt any remedies accordingly. In general, article 9
should be used in conjunction with proper respect for interna-
tional law and political responsibility.1 0 5
CONCLUSION
The Community and the shipping industry together must
face the challenge of making the new competition regulation
on maritime transport work effectively.
Council Regulation No. 4056/86 on Maritime Transport
still has to stand the test of practice. While the regulation will
have to be enforced with the aim of protecting the Commu-
nity's shipping and trading interests, the Community must en-
sure that trades remain open and that it respects the justified
interests of non-EC countries. The Commission must act
where competition has been or is likely to be eliminated. In
addition, it should take action in all appropriate cases concern-
ing typical arrangements and practices to provide guidelines
for the shipping industry and transport users on how to cope
with the new regulatory scheme.
The Commission should also promote and uphold the
principles of unrestricted and fair competition in the imple-
mentation of the new shipping regulations. At the same time,
the Commission should not impede international shipping and
should not impose barriers to trade. This is a difficult but im-
portant task for the Commission.
The European Community is the world's largest trading
area and accounts for approximately twenty percent of the ton-
104. Id.
105. See Rosenthal, Ten Principles for ResolvingJurisdictional Conflicts, in 1985 FORD-
HAM CORP. L. INST. 301 (B. Hawk ed. 1986). For a discussion of reasonableness as a
principle of international law on jurisdiction, see Meessen, Conflicts ofJurisdiction Under
the New Restatement, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Summer 1987).
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nage of world trade' even though it represents only approxi-
mately six percent of the world population. Some ninety-five
percent of the tonnage of the Community trade with non-EC
states and some thirty percent of intra-Community traffic is
carried by sea.' °7 In the light of these facts, one should not
overlook the economic and political importance of competitive
transport services-either by road, rail, inland waterway, air, or
sea. Also, one should not doubt the importance of transport
issues for the completion of the single European market by the
end of 1992.
The Community is now in the final straight of the race to
complete the single market, and fears of a "Fortress Europe in
1993" have been voiced in non-EC countries. International
shipping requires freedom of the seas for peaceful and efficient
transport services. Moreover, international shipping is a do-
main where it is obvious that countries share a vital interest in
cooperation and in harmony of their laws and regulations for
competition in transport. There is no place for a "Fortress Eu-
rope" in shipping.
106. See Progress Towards a Common Transport Policy, BULL. EUR. COMM.
Supp. 5, at 1, 10 (1985).
107. Id. 10 (footnote omitted).
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